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Abstract
This paper uses the only representative sample of the Russian Federation, the Russian Longitudinal
Monitoring Survey, to estimate the returns to education in this ex-communist country. This is one of
the ﬁrst studies to tackle this classic issue in labor economics with the realistic expectation of obtaining
results for Russia comparable in quality and reliability to those available in developed countries and
other economies in transition. Using standard regression techniques we ﬁnd that the returns to educa-
tion in Russia are quite low compared with those reported in the literature on countries throughout the
world, in almost no speciﬁcation reaching higher than 5%. Moreover,there is virtually no improvement
in returns to education in the 1992-99 period, a result somewhat at odds with the suggestion of several
studies using Russian data from the early 1990s. When we instrument our main regressor using policy
experiments from the 1960s, we ﬁnd comparable results. We also perform a selectivity correction and
discover even lower returns to education for men, although they become slightly higher for women.
Additionally, we ﬁnd extremely low returns to tenure, which can even become negative in certain spec-
iﬁcations. These results present a bleak perspective for educated Russians, with negative implications
for investments in education at all levels, auguring the imminent erosion of one of Russia’s few assets
not yet completely devalued, the human capital of its citizens.
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“... to learn, to learn, and to learn...”
Vladimir Lenin. October 2, 1920.1
The estimation of the proﬁtability of investment in human capital has been a central topic for numerous
papers since the question was ﬁrst posed in the early 1960s.2 These estimates have also been used to
investigate other economic issues, such as wage determination (Willis 1986) and optimality of the resource
allocationbetweeneducationandothersectors(DoughertyandPsacharopoulos1977). Returnsto education
affect the overall educational level of the population, which in turn has been suggested as one of the key
determinants of a country’s economic growth (Barro 1991). The question of proﬁtability of investment in
education is now of central importance for Russia, after the abandoning of its centrally planned path and its
shift toward a market economy with liberalized prices and wages determined by supply and demand.
The Russian educational system is quite advanced, both in attainment and quality, even in comparison
to that of developed countries. However, Russia’s low and still declining output per capita as well as its
disrupted social networks and eroded production structure provide for eco-nomic and social conditions far
worse than those of any developed country. Russia is also struggling in comparison with other Central
and Eastern European countries undergoing the transition from a socialist to market economy. While most
Central European transition economies were experiencing recovery of output and substantial decline in in-
ﬂation by the second or third year of transition, Russia is still undergoing a kind of “prolonged transition.”3
Despite a decade of reforms (mild at ﬁrst, then more active starting in 1992), Russians have seen their econ-
omy shrink nearly every year and are suffering a mounting erosion of their purchasing power as well as a
rocketing of corruption and organized crime in all levels of society. No major reform achievements were
implemented beyond the price and trade liberalization and the marginally successful privatization. The
government has reduced subsidies to its numerous research institutions, especially in the defense industry,
and struggling enterprises have little money to support R&D. With this combination of poor economic con-
ditions and a high supply of educated labor force, we conjectured that Russian returns to education would
likely be quite low. We further did not expect to ﬁnd an increase in these returns during recent years, given
that there has been no improvement in the economic conditions.
1 Quote from “The Tasks of the Youth Leagues,” a speech delivered at the Third All-Russia Congress of the Russian Young
Communists League. Nearly every school in the USSR had this slogan posted for all students to see. The promotion of (politically
correct) education was one of the cornerstones of the Russian revolution. More than a means for obtaining higher wages, education
was seen as a good in itself.
2 See Mincer (1958), Schultz (1961), and Becker (1964).
3 Data for transition economies are from ˚ Aslund et al.(1996).
1This is one of the ﬁrst studies to tackle this classic issue in labor economics with the realistic expec-
tation of obtaining results comparable in quality and reliability to those available in developed countries
and other economies in transition. It is also the ﬁrst study that we are aware of that using Russian data
acknowledges the possible endogeneity of the schooling measure and instrument it appropriately, and per-
forms a selectivity correction given that only current workers are used in our estimations. This has become
possible due to the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS), an excellent source of current data
and the only representative sample of the Russian Federation. The RLMS is a household-based survey of
more than 6,000 households (as of the ﬁrst round of data), each interviewed eight times between October of
1992 and January of 1999. Given various constraints and data problems (explained in Section 4), we have
had to consider almost exclusively the last three rounds of data. Our results, however, remain unchanged
when using the entire data set.
We restrict our attention to workers earning positive wages in the month before the interview. Using
standard regression techniques we ﬁnd that the returns to education in Russia are mostly in the range of 3%
to 5%, among the lowest worldwide and comparable to those estimated using Russian data from the early
1990s.4 More importantly, we ﬁnd virtually no improvement in the returns to education in the 1992-99
period, rarely exceeding 5%. This contrasts with the picture suggested by Brainerd (1998), and considering
several drawbacks of thedata setused in thatstudyto analyze returns to educationin the post-reformperiod,
we believe our conclusions better characterize thereality that Russians with varying levels of education face
in the labor market.5 We have further been able to evaluate the relative importance of two factors that have
contributed to the small wage differentials with respect to education in Soviet and post-Soviet Russia. Our
ﬁndings suggest that market-type wage adjustment to equilibrate the high supply of human capital with its
relatively low demand, rather than the egalitarian wage policy of the Soviet government, is the most likely
explanation for the low returns to education.
We acknowledge the possible endogeneity of the schooling level in our OLS regressions and the bias it
can cause. Using a policy experiment from the 1950s–1960s we are able to instrument our main regressor,
years of schooling, and conﬁrm the validity of our OLS results. We also correct for selectivity stemming
from our exclusive consideration of workers in our estimates. The returns to education for males after the
correction are lower than those of the OLS regression, and the returns for females are higher. However,
for the full sample the corrected returns are almost identical to the OLS estimates. Although the RLMS
4 Brainerd (1998) and Newell and Reilly (1996).
5 Brainerd’s study had different objectives, but one of its results shows an important increase in the returns to education in the
1991-94 period and conjectures that the returns should increase further in the future. However, the author acknowledges the lack
of representativeness of the data used, and the study is likely to have measurement error problems affecting the relevant variables.
2was conceived as repeated cross-sections, it is possible to construct two panels using the two phases of the
survey. We use this capability to provide further conﬁrmation of our results.
We also estimate returns to education for various subsamples of individuals: men and women, rural
and urban workers, and people working for private enterprises vs. government employees. Women and
rural workers consistently receive higher returns; contrary to the ﬁndings of some authors, for individuals
employed by the government the returns are slightly higher, although this difference is not statistically
signiﬁcant.6
We additionally observe extremely low returns to tenure, which can even become negative depending
on the speciﬁcation used. This is the ﬁrst study of which we are aware to produce this result, and the con-
clusion conﬁrms the intuition that past experience pays off less in a radically changing economy. Workers
who stay in government-owned companies see mostly the stagnation of their wages once we control for
other observable characteristics, and those who switch to new private/foreign-owned companies or begin
in privatized enterprises also see no increase in wages due to tenure, and at times even suffer a decline in
salary.
As our title suggests, and in accordance with the belief that fostered this project, we conclude that for
mostRussiancitizens, anadditional yearof educationis of littleuse inincreasing wages. Andalthoughonly
supported by anecdotal evidence (given the unavailability of detailed data), the low returns seem to induce
Russians to emigrate in search of a better life and a higher reward for their abilities. Often they leave never
to come back, ultimately contributing to the advance of companies and countries that for decades were seen
as rivals. Additional evidence, dating back to the Soviet period, suggests that Russians who emigrated to
Israel had above-average level of education (Ofer and Vinokur 1992), and similar evidence can be gathered
from the Soviet Interview Project, which uses data on Russian emigrants to the United States.
The picture we present is less encouraging than that of previous studies on Russia, but we also believe
it to be more realistic. We ﬁnd a bleak perspective for educated Russians, with negative implications for
investments in education at all levels, auguring the imminent erosion of one of Russia’s few assets not yet
completely devalued, the human capital of its citizens.
In the next section we provide a brief background on Russia and on the Russian educational system,
highlighting the characteristics most important to our estimation strategy. Section 3 reviews the literature
on returns to education, devoting special attention to studies of other transition economies and previous
studies using Russian data. Section 4 describes and analyzes the RLMS data used in this study. Section 5
presents the empirical results and Section 6 offers some conclusions.
6 Psacharopoulos (1985, 1994), Maurer-Fazio (1999).
32 Background on the Russian Educational System.
In 1917, when the Bolshevik Revolution transformed tsarist Russia into a Communist republic, some of
the ﬁrst reforms were aimed at the education sector. Before then, 66% of the Russian population had been
illiterate, with only half of the children ages 8 to 12 attending primary schools. With little choice other than
to start working at a very young agein orderto support their families, childrenof workers and peasantswere
often unable to attend institutions of secondary and higher education. Access to many schools was even
limited by socio-economic status. In 1919, Russian education was made free, and compulsory schools and
universities opened to the general public (even declaring a preference for admitting children of low class
families). The number of secondary schools quickly grew, and alternative educational institutions were
established for adults who had never received primary or secondary education. A universal curriculum
including required courses for all Russian schools was introduced. By the early 1930s, the illiteracy rate
fell to 38%, which was still considered to be too high. Compulsory education was extended from only
primary school to seven years of mandated schooling.
In 1956, the Twentieth Communist Party Congress denounced the Russian school curriculum as largely
irrelevant to real life and made several modiﬁcations to the program. Certain courses related to the real
work process were added, the seven-year compulsory programs and the ten-year curricula were extended
by one year, although this last change was reversed eight years later. After that, the educational structure
remained virtually unchanged until 1984, when a new regulation introduced an optional reduction of the
school admission age from seven to six, with a consequent increase in the duration of primary school from
three to four years. However, this has not yet become compulsory. The policy experiments described above
allow us to instrument the years of schooling variable in our empirical analysis.
Education in Russia has the structure presented in Figure A.1 in the Appendix. School covers three
levels: primary, incomplete secondary and complete secondary, the ﬁrst two of which are compulsory.
Students who stop after the incomplete secondary level can pursue a vocational degree (requiring two to
threeadditionalyears)oraspecializedsecondaryortechnicaldegree(requiringfourmoreyears). Complete
secondary school graduates wishing to continue their education can study for approximately ﬁve more
years at an “institute” or university (an analog of combined U.S. bachelor and master programs). They can
also enter specialized secondary or technical schools and receive a degree after a period of two to three
years. To enter these two types of educational institutions, applicants are required to pass a set of entrance
examinations, often very rigorous.
Those with a specialized secondary degree can in turn enter universities in pursuit of higher education.
4Institute or university graduates can enter a “kandidat nauk” program (roughly an analog of Ph.D. programs
in the U.S.), usually lasting three years. At every stage of the education process after the incomplete
secondary school level, Russians can postpone or end their schooling in order to join the labor force.7
Russian levels of education ﬁtthe International Standard Classiﬁcation of Education (ISCED), allowing
us to compare Russian educational attainment in the period covered by our data to that of some OECD
countries presented in studies conducted by the Centre of Educational Research and Innovation (CERI).
The 1997 study reports ﬁgures for 1995, and our sample covers the 1992-1999 period. According to a
subsample of individuals ages 25 to 64 from our study (the brackets were chosen to match those of the
CERI), as shown in Table 2.1, the fraction of people holding only incomplete secondary or primary degree
is 16%, lower than in any country except for the U.S. with 14%. Forty two percent of Russians have higher
university or non-university degrees, the highest percentage of all the countries except Canada, where the
ﬁgure is 47%. This fraction is far above the average of the OECD countries, 22%. The share of people with
university degrees is 20%, with only the United States ahead (25%). According to education indicators,
Russia is far ahead of the two most successful Central European transitioners, the Czech Republic and
Poland, where the fractions of people with a university degree are 11% and 10%, respectively.
The Russian population not only acquires on average more education than people in other countries but
the quality of that education seems to be quite high. Russian students performed well in the last Interna-
tional Comparative Tests in Math and Sciences. These tests are standardized and are used to compare more
than 40 countries. Russian secondary school students obtained uniformly higher scores than American
students, and their scores in advanced tests were among the highest for the countries sampled.8
Table 2.1: Percentage of population 25 to 64 years of age
by the highest completed level of education.
7 More detailed information on the structure and history of the Russian educational system can be found in Popovych and
Levin-Stankevich (1992).
8 See the summary report of the Third International Mathematics and Science Study, TIMSS (1999).
5Country Primary and Complete and Non-university University
incomplete (lower) specialized tertiary tertiary
secondary secondary
Russia 16 42 22 20
United states 14 53 8 25
Canada 25 28 30 17
Germany 16 61 10 13
Swedena 25 46 14 14
United Kingdoma 24 54 9 12
Czech Republica 17 73 —b 11
Poland 26 61 3 10
OECD meana 40 40 9 13
a The numbers do not add up to 100 due to rounding error.
b This category is included in the Complete and specialized secondary education level
category.
There are several reasons why Russians have traditionally acquired so much education. The idea of the
necessity and prestige of education was one of the key points of the new Communist regime, obviously very
important in illiterate post-tsarist Russia. This idea remained well-promoted throughout the ruling period of
theCommunistPartyandbecame essentialto manySovietcitizens. People assignedhighvalue to education
not usually because of its future wage rewards (which were quite low) or fringe beneﬁts, but primarily
because of the prestige and self-esteem associated with education itself and with a qualiﬁed white-collar
job. Teenagers, as surveys show, assigned very high prestige to professions requiring higher education,
such as doctors and teachers, although these were relatively low-paying occupations.9 The highest ratio
of applicants to admissions was found in universities offering preparation for these jobs. Free tuition and
stipend, as well as inexpensive or free dormitories, made the option of pursuing higher education not only
desirable but also affordable. These features of the Russian education system and the Soviet mentality have
led to the widely recognized fact that Russia has one of the most highly educated populations in the world.
3 Literature
As was mentioned in the introduction, since the 1960s hundreds of studies have estimated returns to ed-
ucation in numerous countries, measured as years of schooling or as education levels attained. Two of
the most comprehensive surveys are presented by Psacharopoulos (1985, 1994). They cover the results of
estimations of the returns to human capital studies for over sixty countries, presenting a summary analysis.
The surveys include a wide set of developing countries, a set of developed countries, and several interme-
9 Katz (1999).
6diate performers.10 According to the surveys’ results, developing countries have the highest return to an
additional year of schooling, from 11% in Asia to 14% in Latin America. They are followed by advanced
countries, were the return is 9%, and by the intermediate group of countries with a return of 8%.11 The
results are mainly explained by the relative scarcity of human-to-physical capital.
Other important features of the estimates are also reported. The returns to education in the government
sector tend to be lower than those in the private (competitive) sector by almost 25%, and the explanation
suggested is wage-equalization policy often present at state enterprises. This general ﬁnding is likely to
be applicable to post-Soviet Russia and can be tested on Russian data in two dimensions: comparing rates
of return in the government sector to those in privately-owned ﬁrms, and observing the trend in the rate of
returns as Russia moves away from central planning and the role of governmental regulations diminishes.
Additionally, returns to human capital for women are more than 25% higher than those for men, and returns
to investment in general academic education are greater than the returns to investment in a comparable
curriculum with emphasis on vocational or technical training. And ﬁnally, marginal returns to education
decline as the level of education increases.
Another comprehensive survey is presented by Card (1999). He covers not only results using different
data sets, but also different techniques used in the estimation of the returns to education. The study empha-
sizes the importance of a possible endogeneity bias in OLS estimates—the technique used in the majority
of papers devoted to the wage equation estimation—and presents the results of various U.S. studies as well
as some European and Australian studies, in order to contrast OLS estimates with those obtained by instru-
mental variables estimation or differencing. Supporting Psacharopoulos’ ﬁndings, simple OLS estimates
of return to an extra year of education for various samples of U.S. workers varies mostly from 5% to 8%,
with similar results for Australia and the U.K., slightly higher for Finland and slightly lower for Sweden.
However, when the endogeneity (“ability bias”) is corrected by using instruments based on features of the
school system, or on family background, the estimate is consistently higher by about 3 percentage points.
Yet when controlling ability bias using within-family differenced estimates, the results are somewhat lower
than those of OLS. Several explanations of these facts are presented, and the main conclusion based on the
“best available” evidence is that simple OLS estimates have a slight upward bias. Instrumental variables
estimates are likely to be biased upward because of the difference between the treatment and the control
10 The author acknowledges difﬁculties related to comparison of the estimates across samples and countries, where the sampling
methodologyand estimationtechniques areoften verydifferent. However, theauthor claimsthathissummarystatisticsand general
conclusions are robust.
11 When classiﬁed by returns to levels of education, intermediate countries have slightly higher returns than those of the
advanced group.
7group, since the group whose schooling decision is most affected by an institutional change or other factors
presented as an instrument is the group with higher returns to education.
Very few papers study the Russian (Soviet) labor market prior to 1992, when the transition process
began. The main reason for this is the lack of available micro-level data. The data collected by Soviet sta-
tistical authorities were reported only in the form of highly aggregated numbers or simple cross-tabulations.
Moreover, local authorities even prohibited this type of study out of fear that the central planners would
notice possible problems in the different regions. Even if the data had been available, they could not be
considered very reliable, since collection was performed only by government agencies and respondents
were not given any guarantee of conﬁdentiality. Everyone was well aware of the use of private information
in the communist regime for purposes other than research.
The papers that did perform micro-analysis of the Soviet labor market were based on surveys whose
sampling methods and selectivity problems affected the reliability of the analysis. Ofer and Vinokur (1992)
use a sample of immigrants who traveled from the Soviet Union to Israel in the early 1970. An emi-
grants’ survey based on the Soviet Interview Project (SIP) presents a sample of former Soviet citizens who
emigrated to the United States in the 1979-1982 period (Gregory and Kohlhase 1988). These data can
be considered accurate, as individuals in the studies did not have an incentive to misreport to their inter-
viewers; but the sample selection issue could have biased the results of the analyses, given that individual
characteristics of successful emigrants are likely to differ from those of the overall population.12
Katz (1999) uses a survey conducted in 1989 of a single city, Taganrog, whose economy depends
almost entirely on a heavy industry. As the author admits, the labor force in that city differs from that of the
referent population in educational attainment and employment sector distribution. This difference does not
allow us to generalize the results of the estimation of the wage equation, and especially returns to education
estimates, to the whole Russian population.
In spite of the difference in sampling methods and years of information collection, the authors report
qualitatively similar ﬁndings with respect to returns to education. Katz reports 23%-35% return to higher
education (compared to having incomplete secondary education) for men and 14%-32% for women. The
results of Ofer and Vinokur are comparable, 29% for men and 32% for women. Results of Gregory and
Kohlhase are even lower, 13% to 22% for the whole sample. Returns for having complete secondary,
12 Although both samples were carefully stratiﬁed, some problems were likely to remain. For example, the sample of 2,793
SIP individuals was stratiﬁed from over 33,000 cases according to educational, geographical, and nationality characteristics of the
referent population, but it still over-represented the population of medium and large cities, populations with higher education, and
workers concentrated in service occupations, as the authors acknowledge. Ofer and Vinokur’s study also demonstrates differences
between the sample and the Soviet population.
8vocational, or specialized education are in many cases insigniﬁcant or low. All the authors found non-
decreasing rates of return for successively higher levels of schooling.13 These rates of return are considered
to be among the lowest in the world.14
The combination of two factors can help explain this phenomenon. First, as was the case for all other
markets in the Soviet Union, the labor market was heavily controlled by the government, and wages were
centrally determined according to a set of scales and grades. Wage differentials were kept artiﬁcially low, in
accordance with the Communist policy of “equal distribution.” However, ﬁrms did have some ﬂexibility in
changing wages, and the government itself realized the necessity of using wages as an incentive mechanism
to draw workers to occupations with excess demand for labor. This presented the second reason for low
education premia. As was mentioned above, the Soviet people regarded higher education and qualiﬁed
white-collar positions prestigious, which effectively lowered the wage they would agree to accept for these
jobs. These jobs also often presented more opportunities for side income, more ﬂexible and sometimes
shorter working hours, and more fringe beneﬁts.15 On the other hand, with a relatively low degree of
automation and a large demand for low-quality manual work, government and enterprises had to set wage
incentives for people to apply for these jobs. Both forces reduced the wage rewards of highly educated
individuals relative to those with less education. As Russia moves from a centrally planned to a market
economy, the ﬁrst reason loses signiﬁcance, but as long as the large pool of highly educated workers faces
a low demand for their skills, we can expect the returns to education to remain low.
Newell and Reilly (1996) estimate a wage function in Russia at the very beginning of the active reform
process. They use the ﬁrst round of the RLMS, collected in the third quarter of 1992, and ﬁnd fairly low
returns to human capital, 3% to 4.5% for different subsets of control variables. They attribute the low
coefﬁcient to the legacy of socialist wage equalization. However, their results are based on computed years
of education (the survey has only levels of education available), and this is likely to amplify measurement
error, biasing the coefﬁcient of interest downward. In their further research (Newell and Reilly 1997) the
authors report returns to levels of education up to 1996. Their ﬁndings for Russia show an initial increase
in the human capital premium in the post-reform period, and a subsequent decline.
Brainerd (1998) uses several monthly surveys conducted by the All-Russian Center for Public Opinion
Research in the 1991-94 period, and ﬁnds an increase in returns to education over this period by about 4
percentage points. This result, if sustained for later years, might suggest that egalitarian Soviet government
13 These papers use levels of education, or years of education at a given level, rather than total number of schooling years.
14 For example, a simple calculation using Mincer’s (1974) results on returns to human capital delivers a return to higher
education of more than 80%. Brainerd (1998) reports a return to higher education of about 70% in the late 1980s.
15 See Katz (1999) and the discussion of Table 4.2 in the next section.
9policies dominated equilibrium wage setting in the labor market, keeping returns to education low, and
that their removal has permitted returns to adjust to the equilibrium level. However, as mentioned in the
introduction, the lack of representativeness and the problems of measurement with the relevant variables
can bias some of her results on returns to human capital.
All the papers on Russia mentioned above use OLS to estimate the wage equation and obtain the esti-
mates of the returns to human capital. It remains to be shown that the results would not change substantially
when corrected for possible endogeneity, measurement error, or sample selection bias.
When we turn to Central European countries experiencing transitions from the Socialist planned
economies to market democracies, we consistently ﬁnd a picture similar to that portrayed in Brain-
erd (1998). Chase (1998) reports low returns to a marginal year of education of 2.5%-4% in the Czech
Republic and Slovakia in 1984, prior to the beginning of the reform, and then an increase to 5-6% by 1993.
Returns also increase for all the levels of education (except for post-graduate level), with a relatively higher
increase for the higher education levels. Filer et al. (1999) report further increases in returns to education
in the two Republics to around 8-9% by 1997. Orazem and Vodopivec (1995), and Stanovnik (1996) ﬁnd
similar changes during the transition in Slovenia, and Jones and Ilayperuma (1994) report an increase in
returns to education during the early transition in Bulgaria.16 Similarly, Maurer-Fazio (1999) observes an
increase in returns to human capital in reforming China in the late 1980s and early 1990s. These ﬁndings
are consistent with the often mentioned observation that the government sector usually suppresses wage
rewards for higher levels of human capital, and as the government role diminishes, the returns to educa-
tion are likely to rise. Another explanation, suggested in Schultz (1975), is that higher education allows a
person to adjust to a disequilibrium more efﬁciently, for example, by enhancing entrepreneurial ability. If
we consider a transition process as a disequilibrium, we can expect that highly educated individuals would
be able to ﬁnd higher returns to their education and that a more general academic education would bring
higher rewards than one that is specialized, technical or vocational.
4 Data and Summary Statistics
4.1 Measurement and Data Issues
The RLMS is a survey of more than 6,000 households that began in 1992. It was designed to measure the
effects of economicandpoliticalreforms ontheeconomic well-beingof theRussianpopulation. Thesurvey
16 Declining returns to education were found by Krueger and Pischke (1995) in East Germany. However, this is a special case
of “transition” considering West Germany’s extensive assistance in rebuilding the East German economy.
10hashadtwophases, withfourrounds ofdatacollectedineach phaseas ofJanuary 1999. Themostimportant
characteristic of the RLMS is that it is the ﬁrst nationally representative longitudinal survey of Russia. Due
to its representativeness, the broad range of issues covered (including information on employment, use of
time, consumption expenditures, health, nutrition, etc.), and high quality of the data collection process,
this study gives a detailed and realistic view of the current labor and economic situation of the Russian
population. This survey has been widely used for poverty, health, and nutrition studies, but its application
to labor market issues has thus far been limited.17 Foley (1997) uses the ﬁrst seven rounds of this data set
to analyze labor market dynamics, unemployment duration, and multiple job holding in Russia, and Newell
and Reilly (1996,1997) conduct a wage equation analysis, including an estimation of the gender wage gap
and returns to education.
The agencies in charge of developing the RLMS and taking it to the ﬁeld had to overcome a range of
problems, from training of interviewers and important budget constraints to decisions regarding language
in a highly heterogeneous country.18 The result of these constraints is that the survey agencies decided to
use a stratiﬁed sample of dwellings—excluding military, penal, and other institutionalized populations—
and decided not to follow families that changed addresses from survey to survey. This raises issues of
selectivity and representativeness. But given the evidence that the surveying agencies offer, this strategy
seems to have been effective with a cross-section perspective in mind, meaning that each of the eight cross-
sections represents the population fairly accurately, based on the last available census survey.19 The head of
each householdanswered questionspertaining to theentirefamily, but asmany adultsas possiblecompleted
the individual questionnaires that are the basis for our empirical work.
Given the very wide information coverage of the questionnaires and taking into account various con-
straints, some data, especially part of the most relevant data for our purposes, had some potentially serious
problems. Often questions were imprecisely stated or omitted entirely. For example, in the ﬁrst rounds
of data the respondents were asked only to indicate their highest attained education level or whether they
had attended or graduated from a particular kind of educational institution. It was difﬁcult to obtain a total
number of schooling years, and the use of this measure can lead to an aggravated measurement error prob-
lem, and obscure the comparability across rounds. This has led us to focus our attention on phase two, and
especially on the last three rounds of data—rounds 6 to 8—which greatly improved upon the quality of the
17 A set of references to these papers on health and nutrition issues can be found on the URL
www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/rlms/papers.htm.
18 Several agencies have provided funding for this survey. The World Bank, the Agency for International Development (US-
AID), the National Science Foundation, the National Institute of Health, the Carolina Population Center at the University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill, the Russian State Statistical Bureau, and the All-Russia Center of Preventive Medicine.
19 See the RLMS Web page for more details on the representativeness of each cross-section.
11data collection process in previous rounds. In these rounds, for example, respondents are asked precisely
how many years they had studied in a particular type of school, and whether or not they had graduated. We
will present some results using the earlier rounds and show that the conclusions of our main empirical work
are not inﬂuenced by concentrating on the last rounds of data.
The construction of other explanatory variables was less of a problem, especially in the last rounds of
data. The dependent variable, monthly wages, was also relatively easy to extract, but we had to correct it
for the high inﬂation and currency reform in the period of study.20 We use monthly wages, instead of an
hourly wage indicator, because this is the ﬁgure respondents were explicitly asked to supply. Calculation
of hourly wages would require us to use another variable, hours worked in the referent month, which is in
turn subject to measurement error. We also have to consider that in Russia employer/employee agreements
are traditionally based on monthly wages, and the variation in paid days off, vacation days, and sick leaves
could introduce additional noise to our calculations.21
4.2 Data Analysis
We begin with Table 4.1 which presents means and standard deviations of the pooled sample of respondents
of rounds 6 to 8 (interviews performed in the 1995-1999 period) and subsamples divided by sex and labor
force status. The average age of the respondents is slightly below 39, more than 55% are female, roughly
2
￿
3 are married, and approximately 2
￿
3 were in the labor force in the months before the interview. The
average of total years of schooling is slightly above 11. In the ﬁrst three columns of the table we see a lower
percentage of individuals with a university degree, because this sample includes people below 25 and above
64, members of the population who either have not yet had time to complete their university degree, or who
attended school before the educational system was well-developed. The average tenure among workers is
around 7.7 years. Three-fourths of workers still reported that their companies are at least partly owned by
the government, and only 4% of respondents’ enterprises are owned by foreign capital. More than 22%
of workers have supervisory responsibilities in their jobs, and they perform tasks that require some heavy
physical effort for almost half of their working time on average.
Comparing males and females, we see that the average age of females is approximately ﬁve years
higher, and they are married in a lower proportion. This might be partly explained by the plummeted life
20 The inﬂation data were obtained from the following URLs: www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/offrep/eca/ru.htm and
www2.hawaii.edu/shaps/russia/1997inﬂation.html.
21 The choice of monthly wages is criticized by Katz (1999) because it can fail to consider the decision to work fewer hours for
a relatively higher hourly wage, something that could potentially lead to an underestimation of the returns to education, especially
for women needing to set aside time for housework. Our ﬁndings indicate that this is not a problem in our study.
12expectancy of men in the beginning of the transition: by 1994, life expectancy of men was around 58 years
and that of women was still above 71 years.22 Men and women work in a fairly similar proportion: 70.2%
for men and 67.6% for women. Figure 4.1 plots the labor force participation rate for males and females by
age using our sample of respondents. We can observe that the participation rates are similar, with higher
participation for males at the beginning and end of the life cycle. This can be explained by the tendency
of young Russian women to postpone working until their children have reached the age of three, and also
by the lower retirement age for women, 55, as opposed to 60 for men. For both men and women the
participation falls sharply after those ages are reached.
Table 4.1: Characteristics of Respondents by Sex and Work Status
22 Sheidvasser (1996).
13Variable Full Sample Males Females Workers Non-Workers Working Age
N 29,814 13,267 16,547 12,522 5,493
Age 38.79 35.99 41.04 39.99 31.66
( 21.32 ) ( 20.11 ) ( 21.98 ) ( 11.73 ) ( 12.99 )
Wage 209,244 261,029 163,704 210,021 -
( 265,458 ) ( 323,363 ) ( 189,871 ) ( 256,588 )
Female 55.50 0.00 100.00 49.55 52.89
Married 67.95 74.92 62.62 81.92 57.33
% Working 68.90 70.25 67.59 100.00 0.00
Rural 26.68 27.01 26.41 21.57 28.69
Total Schooling 11.02 11.30 10.81 12.41 11.50
( 3.70 ) ( 3.37 ) ( 3.92 ) ( 2.89 ) ( 2.61 )
Secondary Sch. 8.73 8.92 8.60 9.44 9.51
( 2.18 ) ( 1.84 ) ( 2.39 ) ( 1.28 ) ( 1.45 )
Vocational 16.95 21.69 13.14 25.41 20.77
Technical 17.98 12.93 22.03 27.49 14.89
University 12.72 12.33 13.02 21.59 7.83
Graduate 0.57 0.73 0.45 1.14 0.09
Tenure 7.75 7.15 8.30 7.77 -
( 8.92 ) ( 8.93 ) ( 8.88 ) ( 8.99 )
Gov. Firm 75.04 71.88 77.96 74.81 -
Foreign Firm 3.92 4.41 3.46 3.88 -
Russian Firm 30.86 34.79 27.24 30.81 -
Part-time 6.98 5.68 8.02 16.26 -
Second Job 4.35 4.51 4.20 4.35 -
Supervisor 22.46 24.12 20.87 22.77 -
Heavy workload 0.44 0.56 0.32 0.44 -
( 0.47 ) ( 0.48 ) ( 0.44 ) ( 0.47 )
14Figure 4.1: Labor Force Participation. Males and Females
Women have on average only half a year less of total schooling, but they have a higher share of techni-
cal/specialized and university degrees. Tenure for women is higher than that of men by more than a year on
average. Wages for women, however, are on average only 63% of those of men, and women are less likely
to hold positions that require supervisory responsibilities, suggesting the existence of gender segregation
and/or wage discrimination. On average, more than a half of men’s working time, and less than a third of
women’s, involves heavy physical effort, consistent with the higher proportion of men receiving vocational
training.
Comparing workers and non-workers of working age—i.e., individuals between 16 and retirement
age—the latter population tends to be younger (suggesting higher educational enrollment of young people
and possibly higher unemployment rates among the young) and is single and female in a higher proportion.
Non-workers more often live in rural areas, have slightly fewer years of total schooling, and have a lower
attainment rate for any particular level of schooling.
Table 4.2 classiﬁes respondents of age 25 to retirement age by their educational level. Individuals with
the lowest levels of education (below complete secondary) tend to be much older than those with secondary
or higher levels of schooling. They tend to be male in a higher proportion and almost half of them live
in rural areas. They have a much lower labor force participation rate, receive substantially lower wages
15mainly from government owned companies, and perform blue-collar jobs. The comparison of individuals
who have completed secondary education to those with vocational or technical training shows that the lat-
ter categories, requiring additional schooling, do not seem to report higher wages. This is consistent with
Psacharopoulos’ (1985, 1994) observation that returns to specialized vocational or technical education are
lower than the returns to the similar but less specialized academic one. The group with vocational train-
ing education is dominated by males, with few supervisory responsibilities and mainly blue-collar work.
Women comprise almost 70% of the group with technical or specialized education. These educational
institutions cover such traditionally “female” occupations as elementary school and pre-school teachers,
primary care physicians, nurses, technicians, and numerous qualiﬁed blue-collar jobs in some female-
dominated industries. More than 80% of the individuals in this group are currently working, 29% have
supervisory responsibilities, and only 36% of their working time is devoted to physically heavy workload,
versus approximately 60% for individuals with less education. They earn on average more than those with
vocational training but less than those who have only completed secondary schooling.
The university-educated (those with university degrees or post-graduate education) do obtain higher
wages than the previous groups, suggesting possible degree effects that will be tested in the multivariate
analysis. Females are a majority among those with university degrees, but men represent 61% of those with
a post-graduate education. More than 86% of individuals in these education groups were working at the
time of the interviews. Almost half of them took jobs involving supervisory responsibilities, and more than
80% of their work time is spent doing less physically demanding work. Workers with graduate education
mainly work in government companies and obtain lower wages than do university graduates.
Common trends across education levels include a strict increase in labor force participation, from 61%
for people with only primary education to 96% for people with a post-graduate degree, an increase in
share of jobs with supervisory responsibilities from 3% to almost 70%, and a fall in the physically heavy
workload from above 70% to 12% of working time.23 Also, as we already mentioned in Section 3, people
with higher levels of education can often obtain jobs with more ﬂexible working hours and have more
opportunities for side income, reﬂected in an increased proportion of part-time positions and second job
holdings as the education level increases.24 It is also noteworthy that people tend to choose a spouse with
a similar education level, as is demonstrated by the similarity of variables reﬂecting total schooling of
respondents and their spouses.
23 Foley(1997) shows that Russians with more education areless likely tomake atransition from employment tounemployment
or out of the labor force and are more likely to become employed after being unemployed or out of the labor force, than are
individuals with lower levels of education.
24 See Foley (1997) for detailed analysis of second job holdings in Russia.
16Table 4.2: Characteristics of respondents by highest Education Level completed
Variable Primary Incomplete Complete Vocational Technical/ University Post-
secondary secondary Specialized graduate
Number obs. 161 1,255 2,675 3,217 2,991 2,584 118
Age 52.84 45.83 38.71 38.86 39.76 40.60 44.75
( 7.59 ) ( 9.30 ) ( 7.86 ) ( 8.79 ) ( 8.34 ) ( 8.78 ) ( 9.26 )
Wage 112,793 169,438 210,627 194,218 208,601 279,883 273,942
( 96,195 ) ( 247,459 ) ( 250,361 ) ( 251,613 ) ( 262,972 ) ( 331,959 ) ( 231,034 )
Schooling 5.33 8.76 11.08 11.57 12.97 15.94 18.79
( 2.07 ) ( 1.44 ) ( 1.42 ) ( 1.55 ) ( 1.51 ) ( 1.64 ) ( 1.67 )
Spouse’s Sch. 7.76 10.88 11.96 12.03 12.87 14.34 16.26
( 2.95 ) ( 5.29 ) ( 4.77 ) ( 5.24 ) ( 5.93 ) ( 3.30 ) ( 2.59 )
Female 22.36 41.59 45.27 41.09 67.34 55.50 38.98
Married 85.00 86.67 88.52 87.44 86.92 88.12 91.53
% Working 60.87 72.35 73.42 77.62 82.38 86.73 95.76
Rural 49.07 39.52 29.98 27.14 18.32 11.46 8.47
Gov. Firm 79.27 74.63 73.37 74.33 76.34 75.60 88.07
Foreign Firm 1.12 3.33 3.31 4.05 3.72 4.29 10.09
Russian Firm 23.81 27.42 31.78 33.33 30.31 30.97 20.00
Part-time 12.42 9.96 9.79 10.35 11.67 15.02 22.88
Second Job 0.00 2.09 3.82 3.78 3.82 7.43 22.32
Supervisor 3.09 9.92 14.69 11.19 29.58 46.93 69.64
Heavy workload 0.72 0.66 0.55 0.61 0.36 0.19 0.12
( 0.44 ) ( 0.47 ) ( 0.47 ) ( 0.47 ) ( 0.46 ) ( 0.35 ) ( 0.27 )
Finally, Table A.1 in the Appendix classiﬁes respondents by the region in which they live. For the
purposes of the RLMS this vast country is divided to 8 regions, where Moscow and St. Petersburg are
considered as a single metropolitan area. One of the most clear conclusions from the analysis of this table
is that the regions are fairly homogeneous across the socio-economic variables presented, except for wages
(probably due to differences in production structure and inﬂation adjustments). The metropolitan area
differs from the other regions in a number of variables. For example, the average years of schooling are
15% higher, and the size of the government sector is smaller than in the rest of the country.
175 Empirical Methods and Results.
5.1 Returns to Education using OLS
We start with the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation of the simplest and most often used model of
wagedetermination, theMincerian-typesemi-logwageequation(Mincer1974).25 Weregressthelogarithm
of the monthly wage on years of schooling and sets of individual and geographical characteristics, as







where the set of individual characteristics X1i consists of potential experience, its square, and a female
dummy.27 It also includes regional dummies and a dummy for rural areas, in order to proxy for potential
differences in education level, production structure, and other social and economic indicators. These vari-
ables are unlikely to be endogenous, given Russia’s low labor force mobility. We additionally include a set
of time dummies indicating to which round each observation belongs, allowing us to capture the effect of
partial wage indexation in an inﬂationary environment. We also check speciﬁcations allowing education to
vary in level rather than years of schooling, and estimate the equation separately for different subsamples.
Table 5.1 presents the results of the log wage equation estimated on the pooled sample of rounds 6 to
8, using total years of schooling or dummies identifying different schooling levels.28 Since each individual
could contribute up to three observations to our sample (obtained from three different survey rounds),
we corrected standard errors of the regression coefﬁcients for clustering.29 With both speciﬁcations we
obtain an R
2 of 0.24, a fairly good ﬁt. The most striking result is that the returns to an additional year
of education are 4%, a premium lower than that of almost any country. The only comparable results in
25 As mentioned in the introduction we are only considering individuals with positive wages in the referent month. This means
that we exclude those respondents that were either not working in that month or did not receive any wages due to wage arrears. We
control for this selectivity below. At this point we are assuming that wage arrears are uncorrelated with the variables of interest,
and therefore do not bias our results. We also run our estimations excluding all individuals who reported that their employer owe
them part of their wages, or they had been paid at least partially in kind. These exclusions did not signiﬁcantly affect our results.
26 We also run the regression using hourly wages, calculated as the monthly wage divided by the hours worked in a referent
month. Results obtained were not signiﬁcantly different from those with monthly wages. We report estimation results for the
monthly wage as the dependent variable, as we believe that it is a less noisy measure of wages (see Section 4).
27 Potential experience is calculated as Age – 7 – Years of Schooling
28 Given that during 1998 Russia underwent an economic crisis that could have affected the labor market enough to consider
not to pool rounds 6 and 7 with round 8, we estimate the log wage equations without the data from the last round. The results from
this exercise are not signiﬁcantly different from those reported below. Another possible modiﬁcation of our benchmark pooled
sample is to exclude workers of retirement age based on the conjecture that they might face a different labor market. Performings
this exclusion leads to results that are again not signiﬁcantly different from those presented in this section. These estimations are
available from the authors upon request.
29 In performing this correction we employed the techniques suggested by Deaton (1997).
18the literature are those of Brainerd (1998) for pre-reform period in Russia, and those of Newell and Reilly
(1996) based on the ﬁrst round of the RLMS. But as we have emphasized in the previous sections, we
are using more reliable data (which reduces measurement error) and are concentrating on the post-reform
period, making these results even more remarkable. If we use levels of schooling we observe a marginal
university premium of 28% and a technical school premium of only 11%. Vocational and graduate studies
have negative marginal returns, although they are not statistically signiﬁcant. These educational premia
are quantitatively comparable to those found by Katz (1999), Gregory and Kohlhase (1988), and Ofer and
Vinokur (1992). These studies, however, used Soviet period data, again suggesting that almost a decade of
transitions has not increased the higher education premium in Russia, contrary to the conjectures of several
authors, including Schultz (1999) and Brainerd (1998).
Table 5.1: OLS Estimates of the Wage Equation
Using Years of Education Using Levels of Education
No. Variable Estimate Standard Error Estimate Standard Error
1 Schooling 0.0401 0.0043 - -
2 Sec. school - - 0.0567 0.0253
3 Vocational - - -0.0136 0.0287
4 Technical - - 0.1085 0.0277
5 University - - 0.2842 0.0293
6 Graduate - - -0.1088 0.0999
7 Constant 11.8928 0.0739 12.2972 0.0535
8 Experience 0.0215 0.0030 0.0225 0.0030
9 Exper. Sq. -0.0520 0.0062 -0.0575 0.0061
10 Female -0.4179 0.0235 -0.4413 0.0239
11 Rural -0.6127 0.0374 -0.6113 0.0372
12 Region 2 -0.0177 0.0547 -0.0210 0.0543
13 Region 3 -0.3634 0.0413 -0.3757 0.0409
14 Region 4 -0.6226 0.0420 -0.6420 0.0418
15 Region 5 -0.3652 0.0485 -0.3815 0.0480
16 Region 6 -0.3115 0.0405 -0.3177 0.0401
17 Region 7 0.0653 0.0603 0.0515 0.0601
18 Region 8 -0.1246 0.0527 -0.1407 0.0528
19 Round 7 -0.0821 0.0210 -0.0808 0.0209
20 Round 8 -0.4811 0.0218 -0.4762 0.0217
# Obs. 7,343 7,324
R
2 0.2354 0.2404
19These results are consistent with our hypothesis of low returns to human capital in the Russian labor
market. Although university graduates do receive higher wages, when considering all forms of higher
education, an additional year of schooling has a very low monetary reward, even after the general reforms
that the Russian economy has undergone in the last decade.
In Table 5.1 we also show that the wage differential between men and women is fairly high, above 40%
in both speciﬁcations. Working in a rural area negatively affects average earnings, reducing them by more
than 60%, even whenwe control for anarray of regions. Belonging to certain regions can have anadditional
negative effect of up to 62%, compared with living in a metropolitan area. Finally, being interviewed in
rounds 7 and 8 of the survey signiﬁcantly depresses real wages, proxying for the erosion of purchasing
power to which we have already referred.
Table 5.2 presents estimates of the coefﬁcient on the total years of schooling using the speciﬁcation
described above for different subsamples of individuals. The ﬁrst column replicates the schooling coef-
ﬁcient from Table 5.1. The following two columns divide the sample between females and males. We
ﬁnd that returns to education are higher for females than for males, 4.9% compared with 3.3%, a result
qualitatively consistent with, although quantitatively more striking than that presented by Psacharopoulos
(1985), who ﬁnds that women have a return 25% higher on average. In order to explore in greater depth the
differences between urban and rural Russia we divide our sample between individuals that live in an urban
environment and those that live in rural areas. Our results show that in rural areas returns to schooling are
signiﬁcantly higher. In the last two columns of Table 5.2 we divide our sample depending on the type of
company the individual works for. Those working in privately owned companies do not have higher returns
to education, a result somewhat surprising and contrary to the conclusions of Psacharopoulos (1985, 1994)
and Maurer-Fazio (1999). This result also contradicts the conclusion of Newell and Reilly (1996) regarding
the source of low returns to education in the pre-reform and early reform era in Russia. They argue that
low returns are the consequence of wage equalization policies present in the Soviet period and inherited by
government ﬁrms. We ﬁnd that the alternative explanation of excess supply of highly qualiﬁed individuals
is more plausible in post-reform Russia.30
30 Another possible explanation for the low returns to human capital is related to the quality of the education of most of those
currently in the labor market. Those individuals educated during the pre-reform period are likely to have skills less valued in
the current economic situation, and therefore are more likely to receive lower rewards for those skills. One way of testing this
hypothesis is to estimate returns to education only for young individuals who obtained most of their education under the new
system, which we believe has improved with the introduction of new curricula, and the opening of new schools in law, economics,
and management. We ﬁnd no support for this hypothesis as returns to education for a subsample of individuals of age below 30
signiﬁcantly declined during the post-reform period.
20Table 5.2: Returns to education for Different Subsamples.
All Females Males Urban Rural State Private
Schooling 0.0401 0.0491 0.0327 0.0367 0.0629 0.0425 0.0419
(0.0043) (0.0060) (0.0061) (0.0046) (0.0115) (0.0048) (0.0081)
# Obs. 7,343 3,876 3,467 6,143 1,200 5,107 2,236
R
2 0.2354 0.1995 0.2093 0.2057 0.1367 0.2548 0.1652
In order to expand our analysis of the effect of education and other variables on the wage determination
we incorporate an additional set of variablesW1i into equation (1). This is an array of choice variables, such
as a dummy for being married, and certain job characteristics. We control for sector of employment by
adding dummies for working in an enterprise owned at least partly by foreign or Russian private capital. In
an attempt to control for part-time work, we introduce a dummy that equals 1 if an individual worked less
than 120 hours in the referent month. Another control that proxies for a job that has ﬂexible or short hours
is a dummy for having a second job. We also include a variable that reﬂects the fraction of working time
devoted to physically heavy or medium workload and a dummy for having supervisory responsibilities.
These choice variables are likely to be endogenous and thus the estimation results require more careful
interpretation. We include them in order to divide the effect of education into two parts: an effect of edu-
cation on wages conditional on the type of job chosen, and an effect through a particular job choice. Also,
including these variables facilitates comparability with other papers working with the wage determination
equation in Russia that include similar variables in their speciﬁcations (Brainerd 1998, Newell and Reilly
1996). Estimation results of this speciﬁcation are presented in Table A.2 in the Appendix.
Returns to education conditional on the job type are substantially lower, 2.8% for the full sample.
This implies that part of the total wage reward for higher education, as estimated using the Mincerian
speciﬁcation, comes not directly through higher wages, but rather through the choice of a better job. For
example, better educated individuals are more likely to hold jobs involving supervisory responsibilities,
which tend to carry higher rewards.
Another interesting and fairly new result obtained is that tenure effects are essentially non-existent in
Russia: the coefﬁcients are very small and only marginally signiﬁcant. We are the ﬁrst to demonstrate
this, although it is not a surprising conclusion if we conjecture that in post-communist Russia long tenure is
likely to be correlated with belonging to government-run companies.31 We will explore these issues further,
but at this point it is worth recalling that we are controlling for the kind of company an individual works
31 See Topel (1991) fora discussion of returns to tenure and Schultz(1999) for arguments regardingreturns to experience during
economic transitions.
21for, and thus tenure effects are not biased by the correlation mentioned above.
We also ﬁnd that working for a privately-owned company, either foreign or Russian, has a sizable
premium that is slightly larger for foreign companies. People are willing to accept lower monthly wages
for jobs offering short or ﬂexible hours: the coefﬁcients on the set of job characteristics indicate that part-
time workers tend to have lower wages, and those holding second jobs have signiﬁcantly lower wages as
well. The other job characteristics also have the expected sign: supervisory responsibilities increase the
wage by approximately 27%, and wages are more than 10% lower for physically demanding jobs.
Table 5.3 is similar to Table 5.2, presenting estimates of the returns to education and tenure under
the expanded speciﬁcation. The coefﬁcient on years of schooling in all cases is below that of the basic
Mincerian speciﬁcation, but all the patterns of the previous table remain the same. The coefﬁcient for
males now becomes very small and statistically indistinguishable from zero. Tenure effects are again very
low (in almost all the cases below 1%), but this time more precisely estimated, and they even become
negative for those working in private ﬁrms, a result indicating that in poor economic environments tenure
effects do not play a substantial role in wage determination.
Table 5.3: Returns to education for Different Subsamples. Extended Speciﬁcation
All Females Males Urban Rural State Private
Schooling 0.0232 0.0370 0.0098 0.0206 0.0381 0.0227 0.0213
(0.0049) (0.0066) (0.0074) (0.0053) (0.0138) (0.0054) (0.0090)
Tenure 0.0015 0.0026 -0.0004 -0.0007 0.0153 0.0054 -0.0096
(0.0015) (0.0020) (0.0023) (0.0016) (0.0041) (0.0017) (0.0028)
# Obs. 5,878 3,233 2,645 4,925 953 4,384 2,003
R
2 0.2648 0.2536 0.2264 0.2388 0.1682 0.2665 0.1941
In Tables 5.4 and 5.5 we present returns to education by region and by round of data, using the same
speciﬁcation as in Table 5.1. From Table 5.4 we see that education premia are low everywhere, but with
considerable variation. They are lowest (below 1%) in the metropolitan area, and highest (above 7%) in
Eastern Siberia. Given that the Metropolitan area has the highest supply of human capital (see Table A.1),
this ﬁnding supports the supply/demand hypothesis for the determination of returns to education, although
we do not ﬁnd a strong relationship between the (rather uniform) supply of human capital across regions
and its varying returns.
22Table 5.4: Returns to Education by Region. OLS Estimates.
No. Region Estimate Standard Error
1 Moscow and St. Petersburg 0.0042 0.0093
2 Northern and North Western 0.0415 0.0152
3 Central and Central Black-Earth 0.0358 0.0095
4 Volga-Vyatski and Volga Basin 0.0589 0.0108
5 North Caucasian 0.0448 0.0127
6 Ural 0.0511 0.0101
7 Western Siberian 0.0596 0.0208
8 Eastern Siberian and Far Eastern 0.0785 0.0154
Table 5.5: Returns to Education by Rounds. OLS Estimates.
Not Controlling for Job Characteristics Controlling for Occupation
Round Estimate Standard Error Estimate Standard Error
1 0.0336 0.0034 0.0213 0.0036
2 0.0567 0.0043 0.0469 0.0045
3 0.0632 0.0037 0.0516 0.0038
4 0.0328 0.0044 - -
5 0.0572 0.0057 0.0400 0.0078
6 0.0370 0.0058 0.0152 0.0070
7 0.0347 0.0067 0.0213 0.0077
8 0.0498 0.0070 0.0299 0.0076
Table 5.5 shows that for every cross-section of data, returns to education using OLS estimates are very
low. We have, however, emphasized the noisiness of the education measures in the ﬁrst ﬁve rounds of
interviews. The left-hand side shows the estimates of the returns to education from the speciﬁcation used
in the Table 5.1. The ﬁrst three rounds suggest a trend similar to the one presented by Brainerd (1998). But
our estimates using all the rounds of data available come as a contrast to Brainerd’s conjecture on the future
evolution of the returns to human capital in Russia. These returns have not changed signiﬁcantly during
the transition, and some of the lowest levels are observed in the last few years. This evidence also supports
the supply/demand explanation for the low returns to education in Soviet times. The right-hand side of
the table shows the cross-section OLS estimates when we add the job characteristics variables W1i, which
can be potentially endogenous to the wage process. For the ﬁrst round of data we ﬁnd returns similar to
those reported by Brainerd (1998) and Newell and Reilly (1996). We observe that the returns to education
decrease in all cases compared with the results of the Mincerian-type speciﬁcation.
235.2 IV Estimation and Selection Correction
It is widely recognized that the OLS estimator of the schooling coefﬁcient in the log wage equation is
subject to possible “ability bias.”32 A more general structural model has (1) as an equation of wage deter-






If ui in (1) and ei are correlated ( e.g. in the case where both include unmeasured “ability,”), then the
OLS estimate of the schooling coefﬁcient in equation (1) will be biased. To correct this bias, we use the
instrumental variables (IV) approach.
Our instruments for Si are based on the institutional changes in the Russian educational system.33 Two
of the policy experiments in the Russian educational system, described in Section 2, help us form instru-
ments for the years of schooling variable. First, the minimum compulsory curriculum was extended from
seven years to eight years of secondary school in 1959. Second, total number of grades in the secondary
school increased from ten to eleven in the same year, and then eight years later returned to ten. We intro-
duce a dummy for each of the experiments that equals one if a respondent graduated from an incomplete
or complete secondary school program when the experiment was in effect. In our sample of workers, 83%
had 8 years of compulsory schooling (instrument dummy lgsc8 equal to 1), and 9% had one additional
school year, whether they left school to join the labor force or whether they continued their education (in-
strument dummy lgsc11 equal to 1). We use these dummies as identifying instruments of Si, since they
affect schooling years of an individual, but do not affect his or her wage.
In Table A.3 in the Appendix we report the IV results using both instruments. For completeness we
also report the results of the ﬁrst stage of the estimation procedure, the reduced form schooling equation.
We ﬁnd that the IV estimate of the returns to schooling is lower than the OLS estimate. It is not, however,
very precisely estimated and we cannot reject that it is signiﬁcantly different from zero. Given that we have
two instruments we test the overidentifying restrictions and conclude that both are good instruments of the
schooling variable. Finally, using the Hausman-Wu test statistic we conclude that the data do not allow us
to reject exogeneity of the schooling variable, thus justifying our use of the OLS results when computing
returns to education with our sample of respondents.
Another type of bias in OLS models is associated with nonrandom sample selection. Results of our
32 See Griliches (1977) and Card (1995, 1999).
33 For a similar approach see Harmon and Walker (1995).
24analysis are obtained using the sample of workers. If the selection rule of people into the labor force is
nonrandom we are likely to get a biased coefﬁcient on the returns to education. Consistent estimates in this
case can be obtained using Heckman’s (1979) procedure for selectivity correction.34








where X3i is the set of an individual’s characteristics similar to that of equation (1), with education variables
included. Additionally, we include a self-reported dummy of being in poor or very poor health. This
dummy can be a proxy for both poor health and a distaste for work, as individuals sometimes rationalize
their unwillingness to work by reporting a poor health condition.35 H3i is the set of household variables
that could affect an individual’s decision to join the labor force but that do not affect his or her wages.
Following the labor supply literature we include spouse’s earnings and labor force status. As a proxy for
competing demand for a respondent’s time, we also include dummies for having children under 12 years
old and having a parent above 50 years old who needs help in performing some activities of daily living,
such as eating or dressing. Mindful of the traditional difference in effect of this type of variables on male
and female behavior, we also include interactions of these variables with the female dummy.36
Table 5.6 presents the selectivity corrected OLS estimates of the log wage equations for the full sample.
Again we present the results using years of schooling and dummies for different education levels. Given the
statistical signiﬁcance of the estimate of the l parameter, selection bias seems to be present in the sample;
therefore the correction we perform is necessary to distinguish appropriately the effects on wages of our
variables of interest and the effect of nonrandom selection of our sample.
34 The selectivity rule in this case excludes not only those individuals that reported not working in the referent month, but also
those that reported working but not receiving positive wages. This means thatour selectivity corrected results should be interpreted
with caution given the special nature of the sample selection rule.
35 See Ben´ ıtez-Silva et al. (1999) for an updated discussion.
36 We checked a number of different speciﬁcations for this stage, using different subsets of identifying variables, and found
little change in our results.
25Table 5.6: Selection corrected OLS Estimates of the Wage Equation
Using Years of Education Using Levels of Education
No. Variable Estimate Standard Error Estimate Standard Error
1 Schooling 0.0402 0.0018 - -
2 Sec. school - - 0.0674 0.0093
3 Vocational - - -0.0596 0.0175
4 Technical - - 0.0499 0.0136
5 University - - 0.2496 0.0197
6 Graduate - - -0.1431 0.0551
7 Constant 12.1219 0.0630 12.5550 0.0504
8 Experience 0.0127 0.0028 0.0132 0.0030
9 Exper. Sq. -0.0317 0.0075 -0.0364 0.0081
10 Female -0.4451 0.0125 -0.4616 0.0131
11 Rural -0.6201 0.0183 -0.6238 0.0176
12 Region 2 -0.0979 0.0224 -0.1003 0.0333
13 Region 3 -0.4319 0.0228 -0.4439 0.0230
14 Region 4 -0.6769 0.0224 -0.7007 0.0210
15 Region 5 -0.3724 0.0279 -0.3877 0.0271
16 Region 6 -0.3920 0.0276 -0.3963 0.0274
17 Region 7 -0.0091 0.0277 -0.0213 0.0239
18 Region 8 -0.1409 0.0249 -0.1580 0.0364
19 Round 7 -0.0611 0.0145 -0.0600 0.0179
20 Round 8 -0.4252 0.0174 -0.4205 0.0151
21 l -0.2642 0.0354 -0.2508 0.0495
# Obs. 8,011 8,011
R
2 0.2303 0.2341
When we perform the selectivity correction for the full sample, the returns to an additional year of
schooling are the same as in the uncorrected model, 4%. For all levels of education, except for complete
secondary, the returns decline by about 5 percentage points, and in this speciﬁcation they are more precisely
estimated.37 When we consider female and male subsamples separately, the results change. As Table 5.7
shows, the corrected estimate for the returns to education for females is higher than the uncorrected one,
and the opposite seems to be true for males.
The reduction in the returns to human capital for males can be explained by the labor force participation
pattern: as we mentioned in Section 4, labor force participation substantially increases with education (95%
for people with post-graduate degrees as compared to around 70% for people with incomplete or complete
secondary education). The highest marginal return to education by level is for university graduates. Hence
we expect our uncorrected OLS estimates to be biased upward. The higher returns to education among
women even after performing the selectivity correction might be explained by some additional sources of
37 Table A.4 in the Appendix presents the labor force participation equation that corresponds to the corrected results presented
in Table 5.6.
26selectivity, in this case into certain occupations.38 A study of this possibility and the appropriate way of
taking it into account is beyond the scope of this paper but is high on our research agenda.
Table 5.7: Selection Corrected Returns to Education. OLS Estimates.
Females Males
Variable Estimate Standard Error Estimate Standard Error
Years of Schooling 0.0592 0.0038 0.0263 0.0029
Secondary School 0.0800 0.0181 0.0703 0.0158
Vocational -0.0223 0.0292 -0.0771 0.0229
Technical 0.1109 0.0250 -0.0015 0.0267
University 0.3185 0.0338 0.2110 0.0768
Graduate 0.0251 0.1125 -0.2175 0.0768
# Obs. 4,132 3,879
Another possible source of bias in our estimations comes from the fact that we do not observe emigrants
in our sample, or we observe them dropping from the survey. We might be concerned about being left with
a sample of respondents that are likely to have a lower return to human capital because those with more
resources are likely to migrate to other countries. This can also be considered a selection bias problem,
but it is much more difﬁcult to control for due to the unavailability of relevant data. However, we believe
migration not to be a real problem for the interpretation of our results. Although we argue that it might
be a factor for a portion of the educated population, the reality is that with respect to the total Russian
population, the fraction of emigrants was 0.07%, as of 1992 (ISPR 1994). Furthermore, the evidence on
Russian emigrants (Gregory and Kohlhase 1988, Ofer and Vinokur 1992) shows that they did not have high
returns to education. Whether this is still true for current emigrants is an empirical question that is difﬁcult
to answer given the available data.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that although the RLMS was conceived as a survey of repeated cross-
sections, it is possible to construct two panels, one for each phase of interviews. We follow Angrist and
Newey (1991) to calculate the returns to education controlling for individual heterogeneity in a panel of
around 1,000 workers present in rounds 6 to 8 of our data. The identiﬁcation in this case comes from those
who have changed their schooling in the period. Here we ﬁnd low and insigniﬁcant returns to education.
We do not report these results given that the identiﬁcation procedure is likely to be weak with our data, as
few people increase their education over the course of the period. Moreover, the measurement error in our
38 The fact that an individual works indicates that his or her productivity in the market exceeds their productivity in the home or
in another unreported occupation. However, this does not necessarily mean that the most market productive individuals will be the
ones observed working. In fact, our results for women indicate that exactly the opposite is true in our sample. See also Heckman
(1980).
27variables of interest is likely to be ampliﬁed by the ﬁxed effects approach, and ultimately, the results do not
contribute substantially to our conclusions.
6 Conclusions
This paper presents one of the ﬁrst estimates of returns to education in post-reform Russia, using the only
representative sample of this ex-communist federation. We complement the traditional OLS regression
techniques with an IV approach, utilizing changes in the educational system in the ex-Soviet Union in
the 1950s and 1960s. We also perform a selectivity correction to account for our reliance on a sample of
workers in obtaining our estimates.
The returns to education in Russia are among the lowest in the world. This was observed nearly a
decade ago, and it was attributed to the combined inﬂuence of government wage-equalizing policies and
market forces. Using data from the early 1990s, Brainerd (1998) suggests that as Russia has moved from
government dominance toward a market democracy, returns to education have increased and will continue
doing so. Our results, based on eight rounds of the RLMS, show that there is no improvement in returns to
education in the post-reform period, 1992-99.
The absence of such an upward trend seems to indicate that the principal cause of wage differentials
among workers of different education levels has not been the government egalitarian policy, whose inﬂu-
ence has faded almost entirely over the last seven years, but rather an over-supply of well-educated workers
in an economy in which blue-collar employees are in high demand. Moreover, the homogeneous supply
of human capital across Russian regions suggests that differences in the returns to education are probably
demand-driven.
Estimates using the IV approach show that we cannot reject exogeneity of the education variable, jus-
tifying our use of the OLS estimates. We also ﬁnd that returns to education are consistently higher for
women, even after performing a selectivity correction, which in fact results in a reduction of the estimated
returns to schooling for males and an increase for females. The results of the corrected model imply that
selectivity bias is a problem in our sample and that the correction is necessary to obtain the appropriate
estimates of the returns to schooling in Russia.
Additionally, we ﬁnd very low returns to tenure, which even become negative in certain speciﬁcations.
This is not an unexpected result given the conjectures of earlier studies, but to our knowledge we are the
ﬁrst to verify this empirically.
The robust result of low returns to education has important policy implications. First, given the low
28mobility within the country, high levels of education could be correlated with an increasing rate of em-
igration. There is very little empirical evidence to support this, but the results of a survey from the late
1970s and early 1980s certainly suggest the existence of such a correlation. Anecdotal evidence of highly
qualiﬁed Russians migrating to Western Europe and the U.S. also strengthens this conjecture. Second, with
the traditional value placed on education beginning to fade, and with the poor returns to additional school-
ing in an economic environment that is not likely to improve in coming years, we conjecture that fewer
and fewer Russians will pursue higher education and that investment in education at all levels is likely to
diminish, ultimately deteriorating the education level and perhaps damaging one of Russia’s few remaining
comparative advantages, the human capital of its population.
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34Table A.2: OLS Estimates of the Wage Equation with Job Characteristics
Using Years of Education Using Levels of Education
No. Variable Estimate Standard Error Estimate Standard Error
1 Constant 11.4266 0.1279 11.7154 0.1195
2 Age 0.0333 0.0060 0.0345 0.0060
3 AgeSq -0.0453 0.0071 -0.0482 0.0071
4 Female -0.2240 0.0474 -0.2329 0.0475
5 Married 0.1823 0.0437 0.1830 0.0436
6 Married Female -0.1865 0.0527 -0.1857 0.0526
7 Schooling 0.0280 0.0040 - -
8 Vocational - - -0.0032 0.0270
9 Technical - - 0.0622 0.0252
10 University - - 0.2283 0.0288
11 Graduate - - -0.0785 0.0891
12 Tenure 0.0014 0.0013 0.0017 0.0013
13 Foreign Firm 0.2459 0.0533 0.2527 0.0533
14 Russian Firm 0.2220 0.0237 0.2236 0.0237
15 Part-time -0.2539 0.0292 -0.2610 0.0292
16 Second Job -0.1153 0.0500 -0.1113 0.0500
17 Supervisor 0.2723 0.0262 0.2642 0.0263
18 Heavy workload -0.1209 0.0245 -0.1102 0.0246
19 Rural -0.5332 0.0309 -0.5308 0.0308
20 Region 2 -0.0361 0.0472 -0.0401 0.0471
21 Region 3 -0.3790 0.0380 -0.3895 0.0378
22 Region 4 -0.5915 0.0402 -0.6033 0.0401
23 Region 5 -0.3968 0.0472 -0.4088 0.0471
24 Region 6 -0.3211 0.0401 -0.3251 0.0400
25 Region 7 -0.0148 0.0480 -0.0142 0.0479
26 Region 8 -0.1571 0.0485 -0.1744 0.0484
27 Round 7 -0.1315 0.0258 -0.1299 0.0258
28 Round 8 -0.4934 0.0252 -0.4909 0.0251
# Obs. 6,351 6,363
R
2 0.2650 0.2677
35Table A.3: IV Estimates of the Wage Equation
First Stage Second Stage
No. Variable Estimate Standard Error Estimate Standard Error
1 Constant 10.4000 0.3702 11.6176 0.9357
2 Age/Experience 0.1608 0.0216 0.0571 0.0174
3 Age/Exper. Sq. -0.2009 0.0288 -0.0716 0.0216
4 Female 0.2864 0.0658 -0.4088 0.0335
5 Rural -1.0636 0.0932 -0.6632 0.1014
6 Region 2 -1.2481 0.1496 -0.0859 0.1231
7 Region 3 -1.2055 0.1194 -0.4350 0.1160
8 Region 4 -1.3245 0.1251 -0.6962 0.1270
9 Region 5 -0.9297 0.1480 -0.4202 0.0975
10 Region 6 -1.3385 0.1253 -0.3858 0.1282
11 Region 7 -0.9620 0.1492 0.0140 0.0998
12 Region 8 -1.3099 0.1501 -0.1987 0.1274
13 Round 7 0.3578 0.1274 -0.0759 0.0281
14 Round 8 0.1685 0.1778 -0.4635 0.0430
15 Lgsc11 0.1520 0.0799 - -
16 Lgsc8 0.3886 0.0795 - -
17 Schooling - - -0.0047 0.0909
# Obs. 7,343 7,343
R
2 0.0619 0.2200
Hausman-Wu Test Statistic 0.6748 p-value: 0.2499
Overidentifying Restrictions Test Statistic 0.0949 p-value: 0.9536
36Table A.4: Probit Estimates of the Corrected Wage Labor Force Participation Equation
No. Variable Estimate Standard Error
1 Constant -3.2910 0.1346
2 Age 0.1947 0.0067
3 AgeSq -0.0023 0.0001
4 Female 0.1380 0.0422
5 Married 0.2793 0.0427
6 Married Female -0.3251 0.0490
7 Schooling -0.0042 0.0071
8 Secondary Sch. -0.0638 0.0277
9 Vocational 0.2520 0.0293
10 Technical 0.4293 0.0341
11 University 0.5453 0.0477
12 Graduate 0.6697 0.2226
13 Spouse in labor force 0.2606 0.0269
14 Spouse Earnings ($106) -0.0001 0.0000
15 Parents need Help -0.0672 0.0695
16 Female and Variable 15 0.0468 0.0941
17 Children under 12 0.0909 0.0344
18 Female and Variable 17 -0.1394 0.0446
19 Poor health -0.5227 0.0381
20 Rural -0.1071 0.0267
21 Region 2 0.0724 0.0567
22 Region 3 -0.0632 0.0473
23 Region 4 -0.0162 0.0480
24 Region 5 -0.2570 0.0506
25 Region 6 -0.0061 0.0485
26 Region 7 -0.0484 0.0524
27 Region 8 -0.0125 0.0525
28 Round 7 -0.0488 0.0267
29 Round 8 -0.2055 0.0265
#Obs. 17,582
Log Likelihood -0.5123
37